Controlling for interstate wars or military interventions in ongoing confrontations, we can observe that democracies tend to use military force against opponents which are significantly weaker and more vulnerable than themselves. Addressing this contrast, the book turns the 'democratic peace' theme on its head: rather than investigating the reasons for the supposed pacifism of democracies, it looks for the causes of their militancy. Huntley,1996; Buchan, 2002; Müller, 2004b; see also Jaberg, 2002, Ch. Prevention and intervention are thus related to the normative goal of enforcing human rights and promoting the spread of 32 Democratic Wars democracy and liberal values. In this way, the reconstructed dyadic explanation can also account for a secondary complex of democratic peace research, namely that democratic dyads are less likely to become involved in serious militarized Harald Müller and Jonas Wolff 67 disputes and display a greater propensity to peaceful conflict resolution cf. For this reason, challenges and reciprocation by democracies serve as very strong signals to their opponents.
What can be analysed are the manifest justifications that are necessary to persuade democratic publics to assent to a specific case of military action. He is co-founder of the World Society Research Group and member of an International Review Panel of the Swiss Science Foundation on North—South Research. But they are fully integrated into the world economy because they are being financed by proceeds from the sale of commodities for which there is a high demand on the world market, and for this very reason may become a source for turning war into a way of life for entire generations Kaldor, 1999; Duffield, 2001; Global Witness, 2002; Lock, 2004. Preventive use of force may be defined as the initiation of military action in anticipation of harmful actions that are neither presently occurring nor imminent. Both democracies need to be almost sure to succeed, though both know that the other side will invest all its available resources in waging war. Despite the current rhetoric of Western leaders, democracies are great and frequent war-makers and interventionists.
If we want to explain, for example, the behaviour of political leaders since 1815, it is not feasible to give an account of their rational calculations based on future experiences which only come to light in statistical analyses conducted 180 years later. However, democratic violence is subject to the rule of appropriateness. His research interests include international relations theory, security studies and international institutions. As to the utilitarian argument, Kant believed that economic calculations mitigating the war-proneness of states would be more likely to come to bear in democracies than in nondemocracies, not that they would never come to bear in non-democracies. The normative—cultural variant of democratic peace suggests that democracies share a set of common norms, rules and practices which have a pacifying effect on their interactions with each other cf.
If signalling cannot even rely on diplomatic rules and routines, as seasoned negotiators can do to their common advantage, reading signals correctly becomes even more difficult for the full argument, see Müller, 2004a. Nevertheless, there is a downward trend, which lasted until the mid-1990s, as well as the increased risk of democratic war involvement and military intervention thereafter. Most analyses about the nexus between regime type and conflict behaviour are based on the Polity data set. Yet, the basic mechanism works as described by Risse-Kappen 1995a, pp. This is not to suggest that the authors are of a single mind.
What is more, they may even contribute to the escalation of conflict by providing incentives for democratic governments to use force as diversionary action or to expand war aims in order to secure domestic consensus. In light of absolute values, all means are proportional. Russett and Oneal talk of a Kantian system to which some states belong and others do not 2001, pp. . This was largely due to the mobilization of external support during the Korean War 1950—53. By doing so, he is able to analyse some of the dynamics that create the democratic war puzzle.
We are grateful to Cornelia Hess, Susanne Schmidt, Marco Fey and Andreas Mitzschke for helping us with the bibliography and index. On the one hand, this dyadic approach clarifies the rationale behind the general peacefulness of democratic dyads. Elements of the critique include the causal claims, ahistorical concepts and too normative progressive narratives. In democracies, war needs to be legitimized by purposes compatible with democratic norms and they need to be legitimized through the established democratic procedures. It has been shown in history that since 1898 American presidents have consistently linked military interventions with the aim to expand democracy Peceny, 1995. Mixed signals of democracies are depicted in rational approaches as signs of a lack of determination, and thereby as an invitation to challenge or to attack Prins, 2003.
However, a differentiation was introduced in order to grasp the specific character of extrastate, intrastate and substate wars. This theme of generally peaceful democracies somewhat forced to adopt non-democratic means by threatening non-democracies prevails in much of the so-called dyadic democratic peace literature cf. It signalled resolve in Iraq twice, and in Kosovo, but was resisted. This diversity in democratic foreign behaviour highlights the other pole of structuration theory now that we have so far analysed the normative structure that constrains and enables , namely agency. This trend towards multilateral intervention is accompanied by strategic innovations which favour new forms of interventions and alter the face of war.
Typically, democracies in such cases do not condemn states but regimes and draw a fine line between undemocratic governments and their populations. The New Strategic Concept adopted at the North Atlantic Council in 1999 focuses on these new and emerging threats. But non-democracies incur political costs when using force just as democracies do. Under the pressure of world market competition, liberal societies may thus be undermined by the very dynamic which they have set in motion. This questions whether the prospective spread of democracy in the international system will promote peacefulness. At the same time, the discussions in the book caution against an overly optimistic view of the distinct peacefulness of democracies. A risk-averse adversary would thus be reluctant to mount a challenge or an attack in such a situation.