L usura in Italia, ed. The paper is organized as follows. Reforming Regulation and Supervision in Europe: Five Missing Lessons from the Financial Crisis, Intereconomics, Review of European Economic Policy, Vol. The Risk Based Approach in the New European Anti-Money Laundering Legislation: a Law and Economics View, Review of Law and Economics, Vol. Masciandaro, Global Financial Crime, Chap.
A Theory of Usury Contract, Kredit und Kapital, 2002, vol. This paper reviews the insights gained by the literature on this topic and, based on updated information on 102 countries for the period 1998-2008, addresses three questions: which are the main features of the supervisory architecture reshaping? Banche e Imprese nella Nuova Globalizzazione ed. In evaluating the role of the central bank in banking supervision, we considered the fact that, whatever the supervision regime, the monetary authority has responsibility in pursuing macro financial stability. L usura in Italia, ed. . More importantly, these two crucial features of a supervisory regime seem to be related. The Financial Supervision Herfindahl Hirschman Index, Journal of Financial Transformation, n.
As they point out, this may take the form of political, economic or indeed cultural exclusion. The market factor does not seem to matter in this specification. Economics, Institutions and Policies, Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, European Parliament, Bruxelles, Banking Secrecy and Global Finance. The aim of questions 15—28 is to discern if there exists an ideal supervisory setting in the minds of the market participants. The empirical analysis in Section Four allows us to shed light on the factors affecting the choice of supervisory regimes. Masciandaro eds , The Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision after the Crisis, ed.
The next two sections take a look at where we stand in practice. X Rapporto sul Sistema Finanziario Italiano, Edibank, Associazione Bancaria Italiana, Milano, 2005, with G. Having established this premise, we identify the main pillars for regulatory governance-independence, accountability, transparency, and integrity. This paper investigates first the normative criteria with which to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers politicians or non-elected bureaucrats. Tabellini A Evaluating Central Bank Independence: Theoretical Issues and European Perspectives, Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, 1991, January, pp , with F.
Reshaping the Financial Supervisory Architectures and the Effects on Insurance, Progres, The Geneva Association, n , Macroeconomic Resilience, Banking Regulation and Institutions, Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and Institutions, vol. Quadrio Curzio a cura di , Banche Popolari ed Imprese Innovative, 2013, Franco Angeli, Milano, pp Festina Lente? Bureaucrats are preferable if time inconsistency and short-termism is an issue, or if vested interests have large stakes in the policy outcome. We first review the case for supervisory independence and accountability in order to frame the econometric work on their determinants. Masciandaro, The Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision after the Crisis, ed. The argument has later been used by other countries to justify the establishment of a unified supervision for examples, see contributions in Masciandaro, 2005b.
Ordered Probit Estimates with Concentration Effect. . A strong case can also be made for an integrated approach in a financial sector dominated by banks, with little role for capital markets or a highly integrated financial sector. . The Italian stock market is still smaller than that of the other advanced countries, and firms—particularly small and medium sized enterprises—have to depend heavily on bank credit. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account.
The literature has tried to go in depth into the analysis of the supervisory reforms measuring these key institutional variables Masciandaro 2004Masciandaro , 2006Masciandaro , 2007 Masciandaro and 2008 , i. Prèvention, gouvernance et influences culturelles, De Boeck University Press, , 2011 with R. Finally, the government proposal defined common rules on the accountability of the two agencies towards the Parliament and its Commissions. . Public Policy: Off Shore Centres and Tax Competition: the Harmful Problem, in D.
. Reshaping Commercial Banking in Italy: New Challenges from Lending to Governance, ed. . . © Peter Mooslechner, Helene Schuberth and Beat Weber 2006.